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applicant should not be entitled to relief.2 5 Admission into labor
unions is virtually the only area where courts have uniformly
forbidden discrimination in membership.26 In most other situa-
tions, particularly social and fraternal societies, there has been
absolute discretion in choice of members.27 A distinction has been
made between voluntary and involuntary associations, 28 and in
some cases involving the latter, courts have compelled admission
and full membership. 29 But a social fraternity must be categorized
as a voluntary organization, and thus it escapes the prohibitions
on free selection of members.
30
For all practical purposes, Sigma Chi is of no value except as
a forerunner of future similar cases. The court, by skirting the
major issues, established no authoritative precedent. Until the
questions raised by the freedom of association claims are satisfied,
the problem of fraternity discrimination remains.
Carl Timothy Cone
25See Note, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 346, 357 (1963).26 Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1944); Thorman v. International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958);
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Commission on Civil Rights, 140 Conn. 537,
102 A.2d 366 (1953).27 Note, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 346, 360 (1963).
2 8 An example of an involuntary society is one which is necessary for
economic survival, such as a medical association.29 Typical of these cases is Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62
N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960) where the court said that if the exclusion
resulted in substantial injury to the plaintiff, "the court will grant relief." 62 N.J.
Super. 184, 197, 162 A.2d 324, 331.
30 In a discussion of the right of association, Associate Justice William 0.
Douglas said: "In my view, government can neither legislate with respect to nor
probe the intimacies of political, spiritual, or intellectual relationships in the
myriad of lawful societies and groups, whether popular or unpopular, that exist in
this country." Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1361, 1375
(1963). In the same article, Justice Douglas quoted the noted historian, Alexis de
Toqueville:
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for him-
self, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures
and of acting in common with them. The right of association therefore
appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal
liberty. No legislator can attack it without impairing the foundations of
society.
63 CoLum. L. REv. 1361, 1363.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REGU-
LATION AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE.-After removing tile from the floor
of a room in his service station, Calvin Stipes, the manager, and
three employees proceeded, in direct violation of the Standards
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of Safety of the Kentucky Department of Insurance,' to pour
gasoline on the floor in order to remove the leftover glue. As the
employees were cleaning the floor, Stipes stepped into an ad-
joining room to turn on a fan to remove some of the fumes. At
that moment an explosion filled the room with flames. In the en-
suing fire two of the employees died and Stipes was uninjured.
Home Insurance Company, the insurer of the owner of the
station, brought a diversity action against Hamilton, the lessee of
the station, and employer of Stipes. Held: partial summary judg-
ment* granted for plaintiff. The violation of the safety regulation
was negligence per se and the violation was the proximate cause of
the injuries. Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.
Ky. 1966).
For many years Kentucky has held that violation of a statute
or municipal ordinance is negligence per se,3 but only if certain
conditions are satisfied. Before a violation will constitute negli-
gence per se, the statute or municipal ordinance must be enacted
for safety purposes, the injury must be one the statute or muni-
cipal ordinance was enacted to prevent, the injury must be to one
of the group protected, and the violation must be the proximate
cause of the injury.4 The question of proximate cause is ordinarily
a jury question and not a proper subject of summary judgment.
However, it has been held that where the uncontradicted evidence
is such that only one conclusion can be drawn by fair-minded men
there is no issue of fact for the jury, and the court must determine
the case as a matter of law.5 From the facts of Hamilton the only
I Department of Insurance Standards of Safety §§ 1400 (2)(f), 1412 (1)(e)
(1955) (superseded March, 1968). § 1400 (2) (f) classifies gasoline as a Class
I liquid; 1412 (1)(e) states: "No Class I flammable liquids shall be stored or
handled within any service station building except packaged items." The Standards
of Safety had been promulgated by the Commissioner of Insurance under the
authority of Ky. REv. STAT. 227.300. Section 1 of the statute gives the commis-
sioner broad powers to promulgate rules and regulations for a reasonable degree
of safety for human life against fire and panic. Section 2 specifically grants power
to regate handling of flammable liquids.
2 In order to find defendant Hamilton liable in damages, an agency relation-
ship must exist between Hamilton and Stipes. The plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of agency relation was denied by the court.
Louisville Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Holsclaw Transfer Co., 344 S.W.2d
828 (Ky. 1961); Blackwell's Adm'r v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co., 265
S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1953); Pryor's Adm'r v. Otter, 268 Ky. 602, 105 S.W.2d 564
(1937); National Casket Co. v. Powar, 137 Ky. 156, 125 S.W. 279 (1910).
4 253 F. Supp. 752, 755. Numerous cases hold for each of the propositions.
However, the cases cited in Hamilton present a fair cross section of the various
holdings.
5 Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1955).
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conclusion which can be drawn is that the violation of the regula-
tion was the proximate cause of the injuries. Therefore, the grant-
ing of summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause was
entirely proper.
Kentucky is joined by a great majority of the states in holding
the violation of a statute to constitute negligence per se. 6 How-
ever, many of these states will not go so far as to extend the
negligence per se doctrine to municipal ordinances or admini-
strative regulations. Instead of being negligence per se, a viola-
tion of an administrative regulation in the great majority of states
is merely evidence of negligence.7 In fact, only five states have held
violation of an administrative regulation to be negligence per se.8
Such inconsistency by the states is difficult to understand. Perhaps
the only reason for a state to hold violation of a statute to be
negligence per se and at the same time hold violation of an ad-
ministrative regulation as mere evidence of negligence is the
widespread distrust of many administrators and the accompanying
delegation of power by the legislatures. Whatever the reason for
such a position, it appears that the minority position is the more
rational approach. Frequently, a legislature does not feel compe-
tent to pass specific statutes to cover a certain field. Thus, the
power of regulation is delegated to an administrator who has
more working knowledge of the intricacies of his chosen pro-
fession.9 In those jurisdictions where violation of an administra-
tive regulation is merely evidence of negligence, the jury is per-
mitted to substitute its uninformed opinion for that of the ad-
ministrator, who is usually an unbiased expert in his field.'0 As
a result of such a policy many violators of safety regulations go
free without even an excuse for the violation."
In spite of the large number of states taking the opposite stand,
Kentucky has taken the rational and consistent approach to the
6 PRossER, ToRTs 202 (3d. ed. 1964); 28 Am. Jun. Negligence § 169 (1941).
7Ibid.
8 See Lanagazo v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 32 Cal. App. 2d 678,
90 P.2d 825 (1939); Hyde v. Connecticut Co., 122 Conn. 236, 188 AUt. 266
(1936); Maner v. Dykes, 55 Ga. App. 436, 190 S.E. 189 (1937); Pennsylvania
R. Co. v. Moses, 42 Ohio App. 220, 182 N.E. 40 (1931); Rhinehart v. Woodford
Flying Service, 122 W.Va. 392, 9 S.E.2d 521 (1940).
9 Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions,
28 TExAs L. REv. 143, 144 (1949).
10 Id. at 148.
11 An example is Town of Kirkland v. Everman, 217 Ind. 683, 29 N.E.2d
206 (1940), where a jury found that defendant used due care in spite of his
violation of a safety regulation concerning underground gasoline tanks.
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negligence per se doctrine. As noted by the Hamilton court, 2 the
Court of Appeals has held that administrative regulations have
the force and effect of laws. 13 The Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky has extended this rule by holding
that compliance with state regulations is prima facie evidence of
absence of negligence. 14 The Court of Appeals has also assumed
for the purpose of argument that violation of a regulation could
constitute negligence per se.15 As a result of the prior holdings, the
court in Hamilton felt the logical conclusion would be to hold
that violation of an administrative regulation constituted negli-
gence per se.
The Hamilton court found no prior Kentucky decision which
held violation of an administrative regulation to be negligence
per se. The court frankly declared that, "The Court of Appeals
has assumed for the purpose of argument that violation of such a
regulation could constitute negligence per se .... but it has never
so held... ."N (Emphasis added.) The statement is not in accord
with at least two authorities.17 Those two authorities have in-
terpreted Phoenix Amusement Co. v. White,18 decided by the
Court of Appeals in 1948, as holding the violation of a safety
regulation to be negligence per se. 19 The Phoenix case involved a
woman who had fallen through theater emergency doors which
opened directly upon a flight of steps in violation of a Standards
of Safety requirement that the doors open upon a landing.
Hamilton cited Phoenix,20 but not in connection with the holding
concerning negligence per se. The Hamilton court may have over-
looked the Phoenix case, but it more likely concluded that
Phoenix merely assumed that violation of a safety regulation is
negligence per se, as was the case in McKinley v. Danville Motors,
Inc.2 1 Phoenix stated: "But appellant was negligent in having
12 253 F. Supp. at 755.
13Gering v. Brown Hotel Corp., 896 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. 1965); Linkous v.
Darch, 328 S.W.2d 850 (Ky. 1959); Union Light, Heat, & Power Co. v. Public
Serv. Commn, 271 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. 1954).
14Isbell v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 162 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Ky.
1958). See also Vaught's Adm'x v. Kentucky Util. Co., 296 S.W.2d 459 (Ky.
1956).
'5 McKinley v. Danville Motors, Inc., 374 S.W.2d 366 (Ky. 1964).
16 2,53 F. Supp. at 755.
17Morris, supra note 9, at 145; PRossEm, op. cit. supra note 6, at 203.
1306 Ky. 361, 208 S.V.2d 64 (1948).
19 Morris, supra note 9, at 145; Psossam, op. cit. supra note 6, at 203.
20 2.53 F. Supp. at 755.
'1374 S.W.2d 366 (Ky. 1964).
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these exit doors open directly onto a flight of stairs instead of a
landing as provided in the Safety Regulations mentioned above.
. . ." 2 In this statement the Phoenix Court appears to assume that
everyone knows a violation of a regulation is negligence, which is
not the case. No decision prior to Phoenix had mentioned such a
proposition. Indeed, the Phoenix Court was more concerned with
proximate cause than negligence per se. Furthermore, the de-
fendant in Phoenix was not held to be negligent, and the Court of
Appeals ordered a new trial because of a faulty jury instruction.
2 3
Thus, apparently the court in Hamilton correctly stated that no
prior decision had held a violation of a regulation to be negligence
per se.
The basic reason given by the Hamilton court for its decision
is that the violation of a statute or municipal ordinance is negli-
gence per se and it can see no difference between a valid regula-
tion and such ordinances and statutes. Therefore, violation of a
regulation should be negligence per se.24 Despite the lack of
reasoning for such a statement, the decision is undoubtedly cor-
rect. As stated before, there is little reason not to apply negligence
per se to administrative regulations. The administrator's power is
delegated by the legislature and is subject to judicial review.
Absent an attack on the administrator himself, no reason can be
seen to refrain from holding violation as constituting negligence
per se. Of course, the same limitations should be placed on ad-
ministrative regulations as have been listed above as resting on
statutes and ordinances. 25 In addition, any objection to the reason-
ableness of an administrative regulation should be considered by
the court. If any of these conditions are not satisfied, then the
regulation should not serve as a criterion to measure negligence in
a civil action. No such conditions are referred to in the Hamilton
decision. However, since the court could find no difference in a
regulation and a statute or municipal ordinance, the natural as-
sumption is that the conditions ordinarily placed on the negligence
per se doctrine with respect to statutes and municipal ordinances
would equally apply to administrative regulations.
Gary E. Conn
22306 Ky. 361, 364, 208 S.W.2d 64, 66 (1948).
23 Id. at 366, 208 S.W.2d at 68.
24 253 F. Supp. at 755.
25 See text at note 4 supra.
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